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Abstract 
This thesis evaluates the benefits and consequences of using home equity in a retirement plan 
in Norway. Three research questions are answered: “How does home equity affect 
consumption decisions?” “What level of risk is a pensioner exposed to trying to execute a 
retirement plan using home equity?” and “What value can one expect to extract from one’s 
home?” To answer the questions the thesis uses a modified version of a lifecycle model and 
tests it by simulation. The simulation method uses one thousand scenarios based on a new 
Keynesian framework of the Norwegian inflation targeting regime to simulate on. The 
simulation tests two types of cases. One where a pensioner has a high level of home equity 
and a low level of pension pay out and the other where the pensioner has a low level of home 
equity and a high level of pension pay out. Analysing the results from the simulation the 
thesis concludes that there are benefits of using home equity in a retirement plan if it is used 
correctly and in a moderate amount. 
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1 Introduction 
The topic for the thesis is retirement. From a newspaper article Barrow(2011) the recent 
financial crisis has created a new-era of ‘HIPpies’ that have dawned upon the British Isles. 
HIP stands for Home In Pension and HIPpies is name for the individuals in the Baby Boomer 
generation that are planning to use their home equity as a source for pension. Dwindling 
wealth from stock market losses and low interest rates have hit pension savings hard due to 
the financial crisis. As regular sources for pension have diminished the HIPpies want to use 
their home equity as a new source for pension. This is the case in Britain but what if this 
happens in Norway? In Mikalsen(2011) tells that in the recent years in Norway there has been 
a rise in availability and use of financial products categorized as home equity release. Home 
equity release products such as reverse mortgages help pensioners to tap into their home 
equity. The inspiration for the thesis is my curiosity on how a retirement plan might look like 
in the future given the recent changes in the soon to be retirees behaviour. 
The thesis problem is to evaluate the “benefits from using home equity in retirement”. The 
thesis will use a Norwegian framework to evaluate the benefits and consequences of using 
home equity. Using lifecycle theory the thesis is going to model, test and analyse different 
strategies for consuming home equity and discover what risks might come with it. The thesis 
has a focus on Norway. To keep the problem simple enough to solve, the thesis is avoiding 
Norwegian taxes and other frictions such as transaction costs, specific laws etc but sticking to 
how Norwegian housing prices, interest rates and inflation relate to each other under an 
inflation-targeting regime.  
The three main research questions are “how does home equity affect consumption 
decisions?”, “what value can one expect to extract from one’s home?” and “what level of risk 
is a pensioner exposed to trying to execute a retirement plan using home equity?”. To answer 
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these questions the thesis uses simulation methods. Programming in Matlab to simulate and 
using Stata and Excel to analyse the data.  
The thesis studies one way to spend home equity. This is done by a pensioner that borrows 
money on his home’s market value to spend on consumption whilst still living there. It’s a 
way to use one’s own home as a consumption asset. The household that will be studied is a 
pensioner who has just retired and makes a retirement plan for the next twenty years. The 
pensioner has two sources to finance consumption. The first source of income comes from a 
pension pay out like social security. The second source comes from the home equity of the 
pensioner’s own home. This is the basis for the modified lifecycle model that will be used to 
analyse the pensioner’s consumption behaviour.  
The main literature for the theory used in the thesis comes from Romer(2006), 
Williamson(1999) and Gali(2008). Inspiration to learn simulation methods came from 
Ayres(2010). The idea to use simulation in the thesis came from Wei et al(2007). To 
understand the benefits of using lifecycle theory in a retirement plan came from 
Kotlikoff(2010).  
The research for the thesis problem is presented in two parts. Part I explains the theoretical 
background for consumption, interest rates, inflation and rates of return of housing. The 
models presented are the basis for the simulation in Part II. Part II is about the simulation 
method, the results from it and the analysis of the results.  
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Part I 
2 Retirement plan 
To model a retirement plan one needs knowledge about the main determinants of a 
pensioner’s consumption choices and savings behaviour. From lifecycle theory the choice 
between consumption today and savings for tomorrow is determined by income, the rates of 
return on savings and other constraints that the pensioner faces. The basic result from the 
Permanent-income Hypothesis is that the individual’s lifetime resources are distributed over 
time based on the individual’s preferences for smooth consumption.  
A modified version of a basic lifecycle model is used to build a retirement plan model. The 
theory and solution methods come from Romer(2006) and Williamson(1999). The 
consumption plan is now a retirement plan and the household is a pensioner. The retirement 
plan model uses a standard lifetime utility function. The modification is in the budget 
constraint by adding a home equity asset, debt and an income coming from a pension pay out 
that follows inflation keeping the pensioner’s purchasing power constant. The present value 
discount rate is the mortgage interest rate as this is the main interest rate the pensioner relates 
to when deciding to consume. The mortgage interest rate is the central bank’s key policy rate 
plus a risk premium. The risk premium consists of the money market’s mark up over the 
central bank’s key rate plus a mortgage lending mark up over the money market rate. The 
model defines optimal behaviour for the pensioner when he is maximizing lifetime utility 
considering the budget constraint he faces. The simulation in later chapters is intended to 
check what can be expected from the optimal behaviour and what results the behaviour gives.  
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The utility function 
Consider an individual who lives a remaining   years and has a lifetime utility   
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The instantaneous utility function  (  ) is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function.   is which year it is.   describes the amount of risk aversion of having different 
consumption between the years.   is the discount factor and its value is between zero and one. 
The lifetime utility function determines the value of consumption per year for the pensioner 
and is just a standard case of measuring lifetime utility of consumption.  
The budget constraint 
The individuals expected lifetime budget constraint today is 
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The left hand side is expected lifetime consumption. The right hand side is expected lifetime 
resources which consist of wealth and income. It states that lifetime consumption must be 
equal of less than lifetime resources. This is known as the “No Ponzi Scheme” condition.   is 
the price level of consumption in year  .   
 
 is the central bank’s key rate1. The risk premium 
  consists of the money2 market’s mark up over the central bank’s key rate plus a mortgage 
lending mark up over the money market rate. The present value discount rate 
 
∏ (    
 
  )    
 is 
based on the interest rate for mortgages(  
   ). The background for using interest rate for 
mortgages is that to consume home equity one must take a loan that bears the interest rate for 
mortgages.  is a pension pay out from social security. The pension pay out follows the price 
level of consumption    keeping purchasing power for the pensioner constant each year
3
.    
is the value of home equity today
4
.   
  is the rate of return of housing. Home equity directly 
follows the changes in housing prices so   [  ∏ (    
 )    ] is the expected home equity 
                                                 
1
 For the simulation we will be using the Norwegian central bank’s key rate 
2
 For the simulation the money market is the NIBOR 
3
 In a regular retirement plan a pension payout would have decreasing purchasing power over time. But I have 
chosen to model this as a constant to keep the problem simple enough to solve.  
4
   is only a part of his total home equity due to credit constraints. This is explained in chapter eight. 
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after   years.    is debt collateralized in home equity and therefore the interest paid on it in 
year   is the mortgage rate (    
   ). Inflation in year   is defined as        (    )
⇔
  
    
     .    is the expectation function for year   of the future. This is a simple 
expected lifetime budget constraint as it only follows expectations of future averages which 
could lead to that the “No Ponzi Scheme” condition is broken. This happens if the home 
equity is highly leveraged and there occurs a steep fall in housing prices leaving no wealth left 
to finance consumption. A full stochastic budget constraint the expectation function would 
take such an event into account leading to buffer stock saving behaviour
5
 to avoid such an 
event.  
Behaviour 
The pensioner wants to maximize lifetime utility given the constraints he faces. The budget 
constraint is solved by equality since marginal utility of consumption is always positive
6
. The 
maximization problem is 
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The problem is solved by using the Euler equation. This is done by inserting the constraint 
into the utility function. The goal is to find how each year’s consumption relates to each other. 
Using this relation to find which consumption choices maximizes the total lifetime utility.  
The first step is to rewrite the budget constraint to get      on its own.  
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 The thesis sticks to the simple expected lifetime budget constraint to keep the problem solvable. 
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Then maximizing on    to find the consumption relation between    and       
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Rewriting the equation gives the per year solution of how the year’s consumption relate to 
each other.  
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The relation of the  ’s tells that the pensioner’s preference for consumption is that 
consumption should follow a consumption path determined by each year’s  . So the last year 
 of consumption is just a mark up of the first year’s consumption. 
 [  ]  [      ]   [          ⏟
    
]   [              ⏟
    
]     [         ]   
The pensioner will maximize his utility by following a consumption path determined by the 
 ’s which fit his budget constraint.  
The mark up    determines the consumption path for the pensioner  
   (
 (    
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(    )
)
 
 
 
and    is determined by the real interest rate 
(    
 
  )
(    )
, the discount rate   and the amount of 
risk aversion  . The interest rate leads to the pensioner preferring consumption later since 
borrowing is more expensive and savings give a larger wealth later. Inflation makes 
consumption today cheaper compared to the future leading to the pensioner wanting to use 
more consumption today. The higher the   the more equal consumption will be between the 
years.       
 
 
   which leads to       This gives that          . If      then the 
consumption path is increasing between the years      and   . If      then consumption is 
decreasing between the years      and   . To determine consumption we must incorporate the 
preferences into the budget constraint. The pensioner starts by calculating first year 
consumption. To solve the choice of first year consumption some terms are rewritten.   
So from the Euler equation consumption in year   following from the previous results can be 
rewritten to 
      ⏟
  
                                                           
And the price level can be modified such that inflation is incorporated 
   (    )          (    )(    )         (    )    (    )   
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Using the per year relation for consumption and the price level modification to rewrite the 
budget constraint we can now determine     Starting by rewriting the left hand side of the 
budget constraint. 
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And then the right hand side  
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The budget constraint has been rewritten to 
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Simplifying left hand side with   and the right hand side with    we get 
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The consumption choice for the pensioner in the first year    is determined by the expectation 
of interest rates, inflation, wages, rates of return of housing and preferences.   
After consuming the first year’s consumption, what is left to use in the next years? Changes in 
the economy force the pensioner to recalculate his retirement plan each year. So the 
calculations have to be done again. The values realised for the next year are the price 
level     (    ), the pension payout    , the home equity value       (    
 ) 
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and the debt value      (    
   )           . Also the changes in future 
expectations of the interest rates, inflation rates and rates of return of housing need to be 
accounted for
7
. Using these values the consumption in year two    is  
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The last year’s consumption    will be 
       
(    
 )
(    
   )
          
(    )
(    
   )
 
   
(    )
(    
   )
 
   
 
    
    
(    
 )
(    
   )
          
(    )
(    
   )
(    )
(    
   )
 
 
  
    (    
 )      (    
   )      
⇔         (    
 )      (    
   )     
In the last year all of the remaining wealth is consumed. 
Home equity process 
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The way home equity is consumed is incorporated in the budget constraint by the home equity 
process. 
                                                 
7
 How this works is explained in the chapter 5 
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Where the debt changes each year by     (  
   )            
The consumption in year   that comes from borrowing on home equity   
  is  
  
  
         
  
       
If   
  is negative than the pensioner is using parts of his year’s consumption    to pay down 
on his debt and if   
  is positive then part of his consumption in year   comes from his home 
equity.  
In chapter eight the retirement plan model is used to test home equity consumption by 
simulation methods.  
3 Inflation and interest rates 
To determine inflation rates, interest rates and rates of return of housing for the retirement 
plan it is necessary to understand how these variables relate and how they are expected to 
behave in the economy.  
The model for the economy is based on an inflation-targeting regime. The economy is 
exposed to supply and demand shocks. Using a new Keynesian framework from Gali(2008) 
and Larsson(2012) to explain the dynamics of inflation, interest rates and the output gap and 
how these values relate to each other.  
We start off with the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
( )                      
It states that inflation today is determined by the discounted future expectations of inflation in 
the next year plus the output gap and how much it affects inflation is determined by the   plus 
a supply shock   . The value of   is derived from how firms price setting react to inflation.  
The next equation is the dynamic investment saving curve (DIS) 
( )              
 
 
(  
          )     
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It states that the output gap is determined by the expectation of the output gap in the next year 
minus the deviation of the real interest rate from the central bank’s real interest rate goal  . 
The affect on the output gap is determined by the amount of risk aversion   plus a demand 
shock. 
( )             ̂         ( ̂ )    
The supply shock    is modelled as an AR1 process where    tells how much of the shock 
from the previous year is taken into this year and  ̂ is a random normally distributed variable 
with an expectation of zero.   
( )            ̂        ( ̂ )    
The demand shock    is modelled as an AR1 process where    tells how much of the shock 
from the previous year is taken into this year and  ̂  is a random normally distributed variable 
with an expectation of zero.   
( )  
              
The last equation is the interest rate rule which describes how the central bank reacts to 
inflation and the output gap.   is the basis real interest rate which the central bank sets as a 
goal and    and   are the weights the central bank puts on inflation and the output gap. It is 
important for an inflation targeting regime that the Taylor principle holds meaning      
otherwise the central bank might not be able to control inflation. 
The equations all relate together and therefore it is needed to see how inflation, the output gap 
and the interest rate react to supply and demand shocks. To find this the equations must be 
solved with the method of undetermined coefficients. This is done solve the differential 
equations by “a lucky guess” Larsson(2012) of how the endogenous variables  ,    and the 
future endogenous variables       ,        relate to shocks.  
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Presuming the economy relates in this matter it is necessary to find the values of the four 
coefficients         and   .  
Inserting equation (5) into equation (2) and the guesses into equation (1) and (2).  
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(  )              
               
 
 
 
(    (         )    (         )                 )
    
Rewriting the hand side of the equations (  ) and (  )   
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We now have that  
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After some algebra we get (see appendix for this) 
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To mimic the Norwegian inflation targeting regime and the Norwegian economy the relations 
need some values. From Norges Bank(2012) a “normal” interest rate that the Norwegian 
central bank aims to follow for maintaining financial stability is an interest rate of 4% and the 
central banks inflation target is 2,5%. This gives that                   . Using 
regular values for simulation from Gali(2008) the rest of the interest rate rule has been set to 
       and          and the values for the rest of the economy are      ,        
and      This gives the coefficients for the inflation and output gap are:             
                     . For the supply and demand shocks       the           and 
 ̂   ̂  are random variables drawn
8
 from a normal distribution with zero mean and a standard 
deviation of 0,01. The simulation later on uses these values plus a basis        on inflation 
and the interest rate to mimic scenarios that could out fold under a Norwegian inflation 
targeting regime. The present value discount rate in the retirement plan is the loan rate for 
mortgages with consisted of the central bank’s key rate and a risk premium. The risk premium 
  has been set to 1,5% over the central bank rate. The number 1,5% is based on an average 
difference of 0,6% between the NIBOR and the central bank rate
9
 using data from 
SSB(Statistics Norway) from the years 1998-2011 and an average difference from the year 
1998-2012 of 0,95% between the NIBOR rate and the mortgage rate Bache(2012). It has been 
rounded to 1,5% to keep an even number. The new equations for mimicking the Norwegian 
inflation targeting regime are 
                   (         ̂ )     (         ̂ )        
                (         ̂ )      (         ̂ ) 
  
      (    )        
          (    (         ̂ )     (         ̂ ))
      (   (         ̂ )      (         ̂ ))        
                                                 
8
 In a more robust model the values for the shocks are most likely different from the ones I have used. This short 
cut was done because of the lack of time and knowledge to calculate them. 
9
 The statistics from SSB(Statistics Norway): Nibor (3 mnd. Effektiv) and Norges Bank 
foliorente(styringsrenten) 
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The thesis uses a definition of a “normal state” in the economy. This is when the shocks in the 
economy are equal to zero. This means that inflation is 2,5%, the output gap is 0% and the 
central bank’s key rate is 4%. 
The equations for the mimicking of the Norwegian inflation targeting regime will be used 
later on in the simulation to create data sets on different scenarios on how the economy 
evolves over time. This will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter seven.       
4 Rates of return of housing 
The last undefined variable in the retirement plan is the rates of return of housing. The rates of 
return of housing have been modelled to be dependent on the inflation rate, interest rate and 
the output gap. To find the relation between the variables a simple regression
10
 is done. The 
data for the regression is based on data from Norges Bank in the years 1980-2010. The output 
gap is calculated as the difference from trend growth of GDP over the last thirty one years
11
. 
The results from the regression are presented in Table 1 Regression of how rates of return of 
housings are affected by the output gap, inflation and the deposit rates.   
Table 1: Regression of how rates of return of housings are affected by the output gap, 
inflation and the deposit rates 
 
Rates of return of housings are positively correlated with the output gap. If the economy is in 
a boom the output gap is positive. The economic pressure will lead to higher rates of return of 
housing. If the economy is in a trough the negative output gap gives lower rates of return of 
housing. Inflation works positively for the home equity value and the interest rate works 
negatively. Checking the regression up against a normal state for the Norwegian economy 
                                                 
10
 There is a high level of multicolinearity in this regression but to create a perfect model to determine future 
rates of return of housing is enough work to write a new thesis on. 
11
 This short cut was done because of the lack of time and knowledge to calculate the output gap 
                                                                              
       _cons      .104524   .0344153     3.04   0.005     .0339095    .1751384
deposit_ra~s    -2.005072   .6911823    -2.90   0.007    -3.423261   -.5868834
   inflation     2.319679   .6041991     3.84   0.001     1.079964    3.559393
  output_gap     1.282161   .8323003     1.54   0.135    -.4255779      2.9899
                                                                              
 house_price        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .306136855    30  .010204562           Root MSE      =  .08411
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3067
    Residual    .191010391    27  .007074459           R-squared     =  0.3761
       Model    .115126464     3  .038375488           Prob > F      =  0.0047
                                                       F(  3,    27) =    5.42
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      31
. regress  house_price output_gap inflation deposit_rates
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meaning that the shocks in the economy are equal to zero and the inflation rate is 2,5% the 
interest rate is 4% and the output gap is zero we can find the rate of return of housing in a 
normal state   
 
.   
  
                                       
So in a normal state year there will be 8,23%  rates of return of housing
12
 which is close to the 
average yearly rates of return of housing of 8,4% per year over the last thirty one years.  
Simulating the rates of return of housing there has been added a random variable  . It is 
defined as the rates of return of housing shock which is a normally distributed variable with 
an expectation of zero and a standard deviation of 0,01 which is a bit higher than the result 
from the regression of a standard deviation of 0.007. So the rates of return of housing are 
determined at each date in the simulation by interest rate, inflation rate and output gap plus a 
rate of return of housing shock shown in the equation below.   
  
                    
                                 
    
5 Modelling expectations 
In this chapter we will be answering how the variables   [∏ (    
   )    ]    [∏ (  
 
   
  
 )] and   [∏ (    )
 
   ] are determined in the pensioner’s budget constraint. The 
pensioner bases his expectations on the equations from the Norwegian inflation-targeting 
regime and the rates of return of housing from the beta values from the regression in the 
previous chapters. 
The equations 
We introduce a expectation function  .    is the expectation function in year   of a future 
values in years              . The pensioner starts by finding the expectation of future 
values of the supply and demand shocks. 
Starting with the demand shock 
           ̂         ( ̂ )    
Then the expectation of the demand shock in year     is 
                                                 
12
 In the simulation later on the average rate of return of housing is 8,23% and the average inflation rate is 2,5%. 
A predicted real housing price growth of 5,73% is very high and probably unrealistic but as stated in footnote 20 
the calculations are a short cut. 
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Doing the same for the supply shock 
           ̂        ( ̂ )    
       [          ̂   ]    [        ]   ( ̂ )⏟ 
  
   [        ]      
    
The expectation of future demand and supply shocks are just echoes of the shocks today 
because of the AR1 process. In the distant future the shocks will go to zero since   
        . Using the equations for the expectations of shocks we can find the expectations 
for the inflation rate, output gap, the central bank’s key rate and the rates if return of housing. 
The expectations for the future inflation rate in the years     
               
                       
  
( )           
        
      
The future expectations for the output gap in the years     
             
                     
  
( )           
        
    
The expectations for the central bank’s key rate in the years     
  
      (    )         
      
      (        )             
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And using (6), (7) and (8) to define the expectations for the rates of return of housing in the 
years     
  
   
 
  
 
            
 
    
      
   
 
  
 
                        
 
 
  
      
   
 
  
 
                        
 
 
Example 
Using an example to illustrate how expectations work. There is a supply shock   =0,01 and a 
demand shock of         and a housing price shock of          today and       
   . Table 2 Example of how demand, supply and rates of return of housing shocks affect the 
economy presents the pensioner’s expectations. The left hand side of the table is which year. 
Year 1 denotes today. The rest of the years describe what the pensioner expects future values 
to be.  
Table 2 Example of how demand, supply and rates of return of housing shock affect the 
economy 
  Shocks Variables 
  
Demand 
shock e 
Supply 
Shock u 
Rates of return  
on housing 
shock v 
Output 
gap 
Inflation 
rate 
Interest 
rate 
Rates of 
return  
on housing 
1 0,0200 0,0100 -0,03 0,014 0,048 0,077 0,048 
2 0,0100 0,0050 0 0,007 0,036 0,059 0,080 
3 0,0050 0,0025 0 0,003 0,031 0,049 0,081 
4 0,0025 0,0013 0 0,002 0,028 0,045 0,082 
5 0,0013 0,0006 0 0,001 0,026 0,042 0,082 
6 0,0006 0,0003 0 0,000 0,026 0,041 0,082 
7 0,0003 0,0002 0 0,000 0,025 0,041 0,082 
8 0,0002 0,0001 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
9 0,0001 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
10 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
11 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
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12 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
13 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
14 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
15 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
16 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
17 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
18 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
19 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
20 0,0000 0,0000 0 0,000 0,025 0,040 0,082 
 
The table shows that the initial shocks die out over time and the output gap, inflation rate, 
interest rate and the rates of return of housing return to their normal state values of 0%, 2.5%, 
4.0%, 8.2%. In the budget constraint this determines the values for 
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The next year the economy is hit by new shocks  ̂       ,  ̂       and         . 
The demand shock    and supply shock    in year two are 
         ̂                     
         ̂                       
 So the pensioner has to recalculate his expectations of the future values for the interest rate, 
inflation rate and the rates of return of housing.  
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Part II 
6 Why simulation? 
The way I have used simulation methods is in two computer programs. The computer 
programs are written to use the theory presented in chapter two to five. The first program 
simulates scenarios of the economy that is used in the second program to test how a 
retirement plan works in the different scenarios.  
The reason why I chose simulation methods to test the retirement plan model is that 
simulation can reveal problems and calculate levels of risk in the model. If the model is often 
unsuccessful it could be a bad representation of what real behaviour could be. The choice of 
simulating on “normal” values avoiding extreme outcomes is because these states of nature 
are rare and would not contribute to the analysis. The simulation provides results that can be 
analysed to answer the questions that were stated in the introduction.  
7 The simulation of the rates of return 
I have used the framework from chapters three and four to simulate one thousand different 
scenarios on how the economy develops over a time path of twenty years. Using the four 
equations stated below to determine the inflation rate, output gap, interest rate and the rates of 
return of housing in each year 
                   (         ̂ )     (         ̂ )        
                (         ̂ )      (         ̂ ) 
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      (    )        
          (    (         ̂ )     (         ̂ ))
      (   (         ̂ )      (         ̂ ))        
  
                    
                                 
    
 For each scenario the economy was hit each year by demand shock  , supply shock    and a 
rate of return of housing shock   . In each year three independent normally distributed 
variables  ̂   ̂      with a zero mean and standard deviation of 0,01 are drawn. Remember
13
 
that the demand shock and supply shock are an AR1 processes meaning that  ̂  and  ̂  just 
add to the previous shocks whilst    is an independent shock.   
Example of a scenario 
Figure 1 Variables from a scenario of a simulated path of the economy over twenty years 
shows the values each year of the output gap, inflation rate, interest rate and the rates of return 
of housing from one scenario that was simulated. Figure 2 The associated shocks to the 
scenario shows the value of the randomly drawn shocks   ̂   ̂     each year that belong to 
these equations. 
           ̂           ̂         ( ̂ )    
           ̂           ̂        ( ̂ )    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Demand shock            ̂   Supply shock             ̂         
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Figure 1 Variables from a sample of a simulated path of the economy over twenty years 
 
Figure 2 The associated shocks to the scenario 
 
Comparison 
To get a perspective on how relevant the simulated data is I have compared the data to data 
from Norges Bank of historic values of the Norwegian economy from 1980-2010 in a Table 
3: Comparison between the historic and simulated interest rates, inflation rates, the output 
gap and rates of return of housing. 
-0,050
0,000
0,050
0,100
0,150
0,200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Output gap Inflation rate Interest rate Rates of return on housing
-0,030
-0,020
-0,010
0,000
0,010
0,020
0,030
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ehat shock uhat shock v shock
23 
 
Table 3: Comparison between the historic and simulated interest rates, inflation rates, 
the output gap and rates of return of housing. 
Interest rate Min Max Average Std 
Simulated 0 0,1438 0,0405 0,0221 
Historic 1980-2010 0,0131 0,1106 0,0591 0,0293 
     Inflation rate Min Max Average Std 
Simulated  -0,0414 0,1038 0,0251 0,0173 
Historic 1980-2010 0,0044 0,1343 0,0423 0,0337 
     Output gap Min Max Average Std 
Simulated -0,1194 0,1141 0 0,0308 
Historic 1980-2010 -0,0429 0,0328 0 0,0186 
     Rates of return of 
housing Min Max Average Std 
Simulated -0,1074 0,2222 0,0814 0,0419 
Historic 1980-2010 -0,1367 0,3002 0,0847 0,1010 
 
The historic values and the simulation values are different. The main reason is that Norway 
has changed monetary regimes during the year 1980-2010 the values are different since the 
simulation is based on today’s inflation targeting regime.    
8 The simulation of consumption paths 
To test how the retirement plan model performs on the simulated scenarios the thesis uses two 
different cases. The first case is a pensioner who has a high level of home equity but a low 
level of pension pay out from social security. The second case is a pensioner who has a low 
level of home equity but a high level of pension pay out from social security. The first case is 
defined as “case ARCP” meaning “Asset Rich, Cash flow Poor retirement plan”. The second 
case is defined as “case APCR” meaning “Asset Poor, Cash flow Rich retirement plan”. The 
names of the cases are inspired by the title of Chia et al(2005). The idea behind these two 
cases is to see if the differences in wealth give dissimilar results from the simulation. 
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The budget constraint is in the two cases are different as the they will be using different 
values of home equity    and pension payout    The value    is not the pensioner’s total 
home equity. The pensioner faces a borrowing constraint of 60% on his total home equity. 
This comes from that Norwegian banks give on average 60% of the home equity as a 
maximum credit line Solberg(2010). So when modelling the retirement plan the variable    
represents the amount of what percentage the pensioner’s home equity he is willing to borrow 
on. This can be a choice of how much benefit the pensioner wants to leave, the borrowing 
constraint he faces or keeping a bit of wealth for buffer stock saving if the pensioner lives 
longer than expected. So have this in mind when the results from the simulation break the 
“No Ponzi scheme” condition meaning that total lifetime resources are negative14. It is not as 
serious as it seems since there is still some remaining home equity. The consequence of 
breaking the condition is that since the credit line to the bank has exceeded its limit the 
pensioner defaults on his debt and has to move and sell his home.  
The case ARCP (“Asset Rich, Cash flow Poor”) will use the values      for home equity 
and      for the pension pay out. The case APCR (“Asset Poor, Cash flow Rich”) will 
use the values      for home equity and      for the pension payout. The values for 
   and   are simplifications. To make the values more tangible we can think of case ARCP 
that the pensioner has a total home equity value of three million kroner and is willing to use 
the maximum credit line of 60% and he has an after tax pension pay out of three hundred 
thousand kroner per year today. Translating these values into the values used in the model 
using a denominator of thirty thousand we get  
   
             
      
       
       
      
    
We can do something similar in case APCR but the point is that it is the ratios of Home 
Equity over Pension Payout (HEPP) that is studied. In case ARCP the ratio is 
           
              
 
                                                 
14
 Remember that this occurs when housing prices take a steep fall and the debt is so high that all remaining 
wealth is wiped out.  
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   and in case APCR
           
              
 
  
  
      . The “Asset Rich, Cash flow Poor” is 
the pensioner who has a high ratio compared to the “Asset Poor, Cash flow Rich” pensioner 
who has a low ratio. 
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The pensioner in both cases shares the same utility function. With a value15    ,      
and       . When     then the instantaneous utility function is transformed into a log 
utility function. Sharing the same utility function leads to that they also share the same 
preferences for their consumption paths which is determined by  . 
   (
 (    
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(    )
)
 
 
 (
     (    
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(    )
) 
The consumption per year will be different in the two cases as the pensioner’s lifetime 
resources are different between the two cases but the consumption paths are predicted to grow 
in the same way.  
Simulation 
The next step is to simulate how the pensioner’s consumption paths develop in the one 
thousand simulated scenarios of how the economy evolves over twenty years. The computer 
program mimics the pensioner’s behaviour described in chapter two. Each year the economy 
is hit by shocks. So the pensioner has to recalculate his retirement plan based on the changes 
in the economy determined by the shocks. I will explain this behaviour step by step.  
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15
 A comment to the use of a lifetime utility function having a certain time dimension of   is not a realistic case. 
As the time dimension is chosen on the basis of lifetime expectancy the value   in a more realistic model would 
take into account that   is expected to increase for each year the pensioner lives. But this process is left out in 
the model to keep the problem simple enough to solve.   
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The first year the pensioner knows his home equity  , his pension payout  , the previous 
year’s price level    and his debt  . The starting debt    is equal to zero and    is equal to 
one. He also knows the first year’s inflation rate   , rate of return of housing   
   and 
mortgage rate   
    meaning that he also knows what this year’s price level    (  
  )    is. He also knows the value of the demand shock  , supply shock    and rates of return 
of housing shock    today. So the pensioner can decide future expectations on the interest 
rate, inflation rate and rates of return of housing that was described in chapter five. As stated 
in chapter two    . Using these values the pensioner can decide on first year’s 
consumption  .    
   
 
  
  
  
 
After spending the first year’s consumption the economy is hit again by a demand shock, 
supply shock and a rate of return of housing shock and the pensioner needs to recalculate the 
second year consumption    since the state of the economy is now different.  
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His home equity value today in the second year is       (    
 ) this is the change in 
value of the home equity within the first year. His debt today is      (    
   )  
          this is the previous debt accumulated plus increase by the mortgage interest on 
the previous debt minus the pension pay out plus the consumption in year one. The price level 
   gives the nominal value of the pension payout and consumption in the previous year. The 
price level has been updated to   and the pensioner’s time horizon has been changed to 
nineteen as there is only nineteen years left in his retirement plan. There is a new demand 
shock, a new supply shock and a new rate of return of housing shock in the second year. 
Remember that the demand shock and supply shock are AR1 process so parts of the previous 
demand and supply still affects the interest rate, inflation rate, output gap and rates of return 
of housing today. So the pensioner has to calculate future expectations of the interest rate, 
output gap, inflation rate and rate of return of housing again. The consumption for the second 
year is  
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Each year of the twenty years the economy is hit by shocks and the pensioner needs to 
recalculate his retirement plan. As there are one thousand simulated samples of scenarios of 
how the economy develops there will be one thousand different results for the consumption 
paths for the pensioner. Simulating the two cases on the same scenarios and then comparing 
them I intend to find the behaviour, risk and gains from using home equity in a retirement 
plan.  
9 Tests of the simulation 
There were three tests for each of the two cases ARCP and APCR. The first was to test for a 
benchmark. These results came from a scenario with no shocks where the pensioner would 
experience a normal state in every year. A normal state is when the output gap = 0, inflation 
rate =2,5%, interest rate =4% and rates of return of housing = 8,23% in every year. The 
second test was to check how the model would perform without using home equity in the 
retirement plan this was done by setting    in both cases to zero but keeping the remaining 
inputs the same. The third test was to check how the model performed with home equity in 
the retirement plan this is described in the previous chapter as the main simulation. The 
intention of the “benchmark test” and the “without using home equity test” was to have 
scenarios to compare against the “with home equity test”. The main results from the 
simulation of consumption paths are presented in figures and tables in the next chapter. 
10 Analysis 
Now that the main body of work is done. This chapter is going to present answers to the 
questions for the main goals of the research that were stated in the introduction by interpreting 
the results from the simulations and using economic reasoning.  
As a reminder the case of an “Asset Rich, Cash flow Poor retirement plan”, where       
and     , is defined as case ARCP. The case of an “Asset Poor, Cash flow Rich 
retirement plan”, where       and     , is defined as case APCR.  
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Consumption decisions 
“How does home equity affect consumption decisions?” 
 Results from the simulation show that using home equity in a retirement plan will lead to an 
on average higher consumption. This is an obvious result as the pensioner is now using more 
of his wealth on consumption. This is presented in Figure 3 ARCP & APCR average 
consumption paths, with versus without home equity where on the left axis is the consumption 
per year and on the bottom axis is denoting the year. The red line shows consumption per year 
with home equity while the blue line shows consumption per year without using home equity.  
Figure 3 ARCP & APCR average consumption paths, with versus without home equity  
  
We can see that the average consumption path is increasing in both cases with and without 
use of home equity. In chapter two    described how the consumption path developed. In the 
simulation the  was 
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The  ’s are the same for both the cases since the same preferences and simulated economic 
scenarios was used. But the results show that when including home equity in a retirement plan 
the higher the average growth of consumption paths occurred. Comparing against the 
benchmark test the average consumption path with home equity grew higher than its 
benchmark. This is depicted in figure 4 Growth of consumption paths where the average 
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consumption in the first year is indexed to one hundred. The figure shows how much higher 
the consumption this year is compared to the first year. 
Figure 4 Growth of consumption paths 
  
The use of home equity in a retirement plan also lead to a much higher standard deviation for 
the consumption paths. Figure 5 Standard deviation of consumption paths presents how large 
the standard deviation of consumption is per year from the different economic scenarios.  
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Figure 5 Standard deviation of consumption paths 
 
The standard deviation is much higher in the case with home equity than without home equity 
and over time the standard deviation is growing in a convex way. The reason for the 
differences in consumption paths in the tests with and without home equity must come from 
the way home equity is used for consumption since the pension pay outs are the same in both 
tests. When the pensioner wants to spend more consumption than he has in a pension pay out 
this year he must borrow money on the home equity. Each year the pensioner takes on more 
debt. Over time his debt and home equity value increases. As the value of the debt is 
increasing faster than the home equity value the home equity asset is being leveraged. 
Leveraging home equity gives higher expected returns explaining the higher consumption 
growth presented in Figure 4 and leveraging gives larger standard deviation in the 
consumption paths presented in Figure 5.  
The ratio for leveraging is described by the equation 
                           
                                  
 
  
  
                 
Figure 6 Leverage ratio I presents the development of the average ratios of leverage over 
time. The left axis shows the ratio in percent and the bottom axis shows which year.  
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Figure 6 Leverage ratio I 
 
In Figure 6 the average leverage ratios are different in the two cases. In search of an answer I 
graphed the benchmark tests for both cases in Figure 7 Leverage ratio II to check if it was the 
pensioner’s preference that determined the difference. Figure 7 gave a similar result.  
Figure 7 Leverage ratio II 
 
  The leverage ratio in case ARCP looks like a concave function whilst APCR looks like a 
convex function. This behaviour could also be shown if one checked for how much of the 
year’s consumption was based on borrowing on home equity. This is defined in the equation 
                                                        
         
  
          
0,00 %
20,00 %
40,00 %
60,00 %
80,00 %
100,00 %
120,00 %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Average Ratio ARCP Average ratio APCR
0,00 %
20,00 %
40,00 %
60,00 %
80,00 %
100,00 %
120,00 %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Benchmark Ratio ARCP Benchmark Ratio APCR
32 
 
The average and benchmark values for both cases are depicted in Figure 8 Average 
consumption paths based on borrowing on home equity 
Figure 8 Average consumption paths based on borrowing on home equity 
 
First years average consumption based on borrowing on home equity in case ARCP is 4,129 
and in case APCR is 1,47. If we divide the first year consumption by the first years value of 
home equity in both cases we get 
          
     
  
                
          
    
  
              
In case ARCP the pensioner starts his consumption path by using a higher percentage of his 
home equity than in case APCR. 
The differences in growth rates of the consumption paths are presented in Figure 9 
Consumption path growth based on borrowing on home equity. The consumption in the first 
year is indexed to one hundred in both cases. The figure shows the relative level of 
consumption in year t compared to the first year. 
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Figure 9 Consumption path growth based on borrowing on home equity 
 
The figure shows that case APCR grows faster than in case ARCP. This figure seems odd if it 
is compared to Figure 4. Shouldn’t the consumption path growth based on borrowing on 
home equity be equal if in both cases they share a similar consumption path growth 
preference of  ? The reason why case ARCP consumption path based on borrowing on home 
equity grows slower and starts on a higher level of consumption relative to home equity than 
in case APCR is because of a hidden wealth effect in the budget constraint. Studying the home 
equity process on the right hand side of the budget constraint described in chapter two.   
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Rewriting the home equity process 
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Since   
  (  
   ) most of the time the higher the percentage of    the right hand side of 
the budget constraint consists of the higher the expected rates of return on the lifetime 
resources portfolio. And since case ARCP has a higher percentage of    leads to a noticeable 
wealth effect by choosing to consume more today of home equity and having a flatter 
consumption path. 
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Risk 
“What level of risk is a pensioner exposed to trying to execute a retirement plan using home 
equity?” 
In the retirement plan the pensioner spends his home equity by borrowing money from the 
bank. This debt process is in a way self financing since the rate of return of housing   
  is 
larger than the mortgage rate (  
   )  most of the time, given that the debt    is lower than 
the home equity  . So the increase of value of home equity covers the interest payments on 
the debt most of the time. When the pensioner borrows more each year to finance 
consumption the home equity asset gets more leveraged. And with all leveraged assets this 
leads to higher variance in future rates of return of the net value of wealth     . In chapter 
two a weakness in the budget constraint was presented. If home equity value sharply dropped 
while being highly leveraged would lead to that the “No Ponzi scheme” condition being 
broken. This in turn would lead to negative consumption as there are no lifetime resources left 
to spend only debt to be repaid. The consequence as explained in chapter eight is that the 
pensioner would default on his debt meaning he would have to move and sell his home. 
Keeping what is left of his home equity after the debt has been repaid. 
In the simulations of the test without home equity none of the “No Ponzi scheme” conditions 
were broken. As the pension pay outs are a secure form for income. When the simulation was 
tested with home equity the “No Ponzi scheme” condition was broken 5,3% of the time in the 
ARCP and 0,4% in the APCR case. The reason for the “No Ponzi scheme” condition being 
broken more often in ARCP case than in the APCR case is that if we study Figure 6 again the 
ARCP case is on average more leveraged that the APCR case in every year in the retirement 
plan. This tells us that the higher the Home Equity over Pension Pay Out (HEPP) ratio 
  
  
 
meaning that the pensioner’s lifetime resources have a higher percentage of home equity in 
the portfolio the stronger is the hidden wealth effect. The stronger the hidden wealth effect the 
higher exposure to leverage over time. This again leads to a higher risk of breaking the “No 
Ponzi scheme” condition.   
Other problems that arise because of a high HEPP ratio are revealed studying Figure 10 Min, 
Max, Average leverage ratios.  The figure presents the minimum, maximum and average 
leverage ratios. Notice that the max leverage ratio is above 100% in the last years meaning 
that      . 
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Figure 10 Min, Max, Average leverage ratios 
 
In several of the consumption paths the leverage level is above 100% in some of years 
without breaking the No Ponzi scheme condition. The pensioner has to use his pension pay 
out to finance the debt. This lowers his consumption in those years. The event of having to 
use the pension pay out to finance the debt is when        and    . Table 3 
Occurrence of having to use pension pay outs to finance the debt presents how often in per 
cent of the one thousand simulated consumption paths the pensioner has to finance the debt 
with the pension pay out in the two cases.  
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Table 4 Occurrence of having to use pension payouts to finance debt 
 Year ARCP APCR 
1 0,0 % 0,0 % 
2 0,0 % 0,0 % 
3 0,0 % 0,0 % 
4 0,0 % 0,0 % 
5 0,0 % 0,0 % 
6 0,0 % 0,0 % 
7 0,0 % 0,0 % 
8 0,0 % 0,0 % 
9 0,0 % 0,0 % 
10 0,0 % 0,0 % 
11 0,0 % 0,0 % 
12 0,1 % 0,1 % 
13 0,2 % 0,0 % 
14 0,7 % 0,0 % 
15 1,5 % 0,5 % 
16 4,6 % 0,8 % 
17 6,6 % 1,9 % 
18 10,4 % 5,3 % 
19 17,7 % 10,4 % 
20 23,8 % 17,6 % 
 
Case ARCP the pensioner has to finance the debt more often than in the APCR case meaning 
that the lower HEPP ratio gives a less probability of having to finance the debt with the 
pension pay out. Having a high HEPP ratio also leads to a larger reduction of consumption as 
the pensioner has a lower pension pay out to finance the debt combined with that the debt is 
more likely to be higher which meant the pensioner having higher interest payments. 
Having a lower HEPP ratio leads to less risk of breaking the “No Ponzi scheme” condition 
and reduces the probability and costs of having to finance the debt with the pension pay out.     
Home equity value 
“What value can one expect to extract from one’s home?” 
Thinking that there was an easy answer to this question, I was wrong but the question has 
exposed an interesting relation. Before all the simulations I assumed that the consumption 
contributed from home equity in the retirement plan would follow the same trend growth rate 
  defined in chapter two. But the hidden wealth effect gave a different story as the weights on 
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home equity in the portfolio for lifetime resources gave different consumption paths for 
consumption contributed from home equity. So the results gave no clean answer to “What 
value can one expect to extract from one’s home?” but there are many other aspects to the 
question that need to be discussed.  
 In the beginning of this chapter the research concluded that on average consumption is higher 
if one uses home equity in the retirement plan. Utility is a better measure than consumption if 
one wants to measure the contribution of home equity. Testing the hypothesis “Using home 
equity always leads to higher lifetime utility” is a good starting point.  
The simulation calculated the total lifetime utility function  [∑               (  )]in the tests 
with and without home equity and in both cases ARCP and APCR. In case ARCP the lifetime 
utility was higher with home equity than without home equity 94,7% of time and in case 
APCR the utility was higher 99,6% of the time. The hypothesis is false. Studying the 
simulation closer utility was lower only when the pensioner broke the “No Ponzi scheme” 
condition. When the pensioner breaks the No Ponzi scheme condition consumption becomes 
negative as the pensioner has to repay his debt. In the log utility function if     the log 
utility function is undefined. I was expecting to find a different result for the percentages of 
higher utility since using the log utility function          ( )     and in some cases I 
thought that consumption would be so low that the percentages of higher utility would take 
into account these outcomes. But this did not happen. Table 4 Lifetime utility results from the 
simulation present the minimum, maximum, benchmark, average and standard deviation of 
lifetime utility of the consumption paths that did not break the “No Ponzi scheme” condition.   
Table 5 Lifetime utility results from the simulation      
  ARCP APCR 
  
Utility With Home 
Equity 
Utility Without 
Home Equity 
Utility With Home 
Equity 
Utility Without 
Home Equity 
Min 43,676 41,559 50,0742058 48,869 
Max 60,883 41,701 60,3931507 49,010 
Benchmark 50,834   53,6085654   
Average 50,447 41,618 53,5336403 48,928 
Standard 
Deviation 2,913 0,021 1,6396622 0,021 
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Regression 
Two regressions are used to check how the value of lifetime utility in the cases ARCP and 
APCR are affected by the averages of the interest rate, inflation rate, output gap and rate of 
return of housing in the one thousand scenarios of how the economy developed. The intention 
of the regression is to confirm the pensioner’s behaviour in the retirement plan. The 
regression is on the samples where the pensioner did not break the “No Ponzi scheme” 
condition as lifetime utility is undefined for the samples that did. The results from the 
regressions are depicted in Table 6: Regression on lifetime utility cases ARCP and in Table 7: 
Regression on lifetime utility cases APCR.  
Table 6: Regression on lifetime utility case ARCP 
 
Table 7: Regression on lifetime utility case APCR 
 
There is a high level of multicolinearity in the regressions. The rate of return of housing is 
determined by the interest rate, inflation rate and the output gap. The interest rate is 
determined by the inflation rate and the output gap by the central bank’s interest rule which 
                                                                              
       _cons     44.32821   .9509343    46.62   0.000     42.46201     46.1944
     hp_mean     128.3731   8.971123    14.31   0.000     110.7674    145.9788
      x_mean    -5.405864    12.4352    -0.43   0.664    -29.80976    18.99803
     pi_mean    -145.4729   54.90661    -2.65   0.008    -253.2263   -37.71951
      i_mean    -17.52685   39.14158    -0.45   0.654    -94.34163    59.28793
                                                                              
     Utility        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    8029.65165   946  8.48800385           Root MSE      =  .59128
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9588
    Residual    329.339587   942  .349617396           R-squared     =  0.9590
       Model    7700.31206     4  1925.07801           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   942) = 5506.24
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     947
                                                                              
       _cons     49.35413   .5240718    94.17   0.000     48.32571    50.38255
     hp_mean     77.78604    4.94775    15.72   0.000     68.07677    87.49531
      x_mean    -5.645778   6.817362    -0.83   0.408     -19.0239    7.732345
     pi_mean    -84.09381   29.00985    -2.90   0.004    -141.0216   -27.16603
      i_mean    -.8827857   20.74824    -0.04   0.966    -41.59832    39.83275
                                                                              
     Utility        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2675.07157   995  2.68851414           Root MSE      =  .33294
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9588
    Residual    109.853424   991  .110851084           R-squared     =  0.9589
       Model    2565.21814     4  641.304535           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   991) = 5785.28
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     996
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reacts to the inflation rate and the output gap. The pensioner’s consumption decision is 
directly affected by the interest rate, inflation rate and the rate of return of housing while the 
output gap affects consumption indirectly through those variables explaining why the output 
gap has such a low coefficient in the regression. The confidence intervals show that the 
estimates are highly uncertain so we can’t know for sure that the output gap doesn’t affect 
lifetime utility and that the other variables affect lifetime utility in there estimated values. 
Taking these problems of multicolinearity and wide confidence intervals into account the 
regression is only used to confirm what is already known and not to find anything new.  
Rates of return of housing 
The coefficient of the rates of return of housing is higher in case ARCP than in case APCR. A 
higher rate of return of housing contributes more lifetime consumption for case ARCP than in 
case APCR because a higher percentage and value of the lifetime resources in case ARCP 
consist of home equity. The average home equity per year for the two cases is depicted in 
Figure 11 Average home equity per year in nominal values  
Figure 11 Average home equity per year in nominal values 
 
Interest rates 
A high average interest rate affects case ARCP more negatively than in case APCR. This is 
because in case ARCP has an on average higher debt each year compared to case APCR 
which makes the retirement plan more costly for ARCP if interest rates are high. The average 
debt per year is depicted in Figure 12 Average debt per year in nominal values. The average 
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interest payments per year in nominal values are depicted in Figure 13 Average interest 
payments per year in nominal values.  
Figure 12 Average debt per year in nominal values 
 
Figure 13 Average interest payments per year in nominal values 
 
Inflation 
Inflation is bad for the pensioner. It lowers the value of savings. Savings in the retirement 
plan mainly consists of home equity. Case APCR has a low level of home equity so the 
pensioner is less exposed to inflation. He has also a high income from the pension payout 
which keeps its purchasing power no matter what inflation is. Case ARCP has the opposite 
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with a high savings in home equity and a low pension pay out. High inflation is worse for 
case ARCP than for case APCR. 
11 Conclusion 
The thesis was an evaluation of the value and consequences of using home equity in a 
retirement plan in Norway. Three research questions were answered. “How does home equity 
affect consumption decisions?” “What level of risk is a pensioner exposed to trying to execute 
a retirement plan using home equity?” and “What value can one expect to extract from one’s 
home?” To answer the questions the thesis used a modified version of a standard lifecycle 
model to model a retirement plan. Simulation methods were used to test the retirement plan. 
To create one thousand scenarios of how the economy will develop a new Keynesian 
framework of the Norwegian inflation targeting regime was used to create variables on 
inflation, interest rates and the output gap. The variables for rates of return of housing came 
from a regression of historic rates of return of housing. Two different cases were tested. One 
where the pensioner had a high level of home equity and a low pension pay out and the other 
where the pensioner had a low level of home equity and a high pension pay out. Studying the 
results from the simulation the research found out that even though the two cases had similar 
growth in their consumption paths the consumption path for consumption from home equity 
was different. This was because of a hidden wealth effect due to the different lifetime 
resource composition of the two cases. The thesis revealed that if a pensioner used a simple 
budget constraint he was exposed to a risk of default. This happens in a scenario where the 
home equity is highly leveraged. A steep fall in housing prices leads to the pensioner’s wealth 
becoming negative and the consequence would be that the pensioner would have to move and 
sell his home. The home equity over pension pay out ratio determined the level of risk. The 
higher the ratio the more vulnerable the pensioner was to default while a lower ratio avoided 
this situation as the pensioner’s pension pay out had a better ability to finance the debt. The 
thesis also found out that using home equity in a retirement plan increased utility for the 
pensioner most of the time. A regression on the results of lifetime utility showed that different 
levels of home equity over pension pay out ratios led to that the interest rate, inflation rate and 
the rate of return of housing affect lifetime utility in a different way. These findings gave the 
answer to the thesis problem. There are benefits to using home equity in a retirement plan if 
used correctly and in a moderate amount.        
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13 Data 
Source: Norges Bank, modified from indexes. http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-
stability/historical-monetary-statistics/ 
Table 8 Data for the regression 
Year 
Rates of 
return of 
housing 
GDP annual 
growth 
Deviation 
from 
average 
annual 
growth of 
GDP. Inflation 
Deposit 
rates 
The real 
interest 
rate 
1980 0,0923 0,0449 0,0187 0,1105 0,0713 -0,0392 
1981 0,3002 0,0156 -0,0105 0,1343 0,0766 -0,0577 
1982 0,2227 0,0012 -0,0250 0,1140 0,0813 -0,0327 
1983 0,0552 0,0386 0,0125 0,0846 0,0840 -0,0006 
1984 0,0827 0,0590 0,0328 0,0635 0,0876 0,0241 
1985 0,0718 0,0535 0,0273 0,0563 0,0901 0,0338 
1986 0,2984 0,0403 0,0142 0,0711 0,0957 0,0246 
1987 0,2314 0,0178 -0,0084 0,0875 0,1101 0,0226 
1988 -0,0038 -0,0016 -0,0278 0,0666 0,1106 0,0440 
1989 -0,1367 0,0099 -0,0163 0,0455 0,0907 0,0452 
1990 -0,0396 0,0193 -0,0069 0,0410 0,0897 0,0487 
1991 -0,0779 0,0310 0,0048 0,0346 0,0866 0,0520 
1992 -0,0828 0,0353 0,0092 0,0231 0,0870 0,0639 
1993 0,0632 0,0278 0,0016 0,0226 0,0584 0,0358 
1994 0,1426 0,0506 0,0244 0,0143 0,0403 0,0260 
1995 0,0758 0,0419 0,0157 0,0250 0,0399 0,0149 
1996 0,1064 0,0509 0,0247 0,0117 0,0363 0,0246 
1997 0,0874 0,0540 0,0279 0,0262 0,0271 0,0009 
1998 0,1447 0,0268 0,0006 0,0225 0,0450 0,0225 
1999 0,1304 0,0202 -0,0060 0,0230 0,0483 0,0253 
2000 0,1517 0,0326 0,0064 0,0313 0,0506 0,0193 
2001 0,0770 0,0200 -0,0062 0,0303 0,0580 0,0277 
2002 0,0665 0,0150 -0,0112 0,0129 0,0557 0,0428 
2003 0,0188 0,0098 -0,0164 0,0245 0,0322 0,0077 
2004 0,1231 0,0397 0,0135 0,0044 0,0131 0,0087 
2005 0,0909 0,0259 -0,0003 0,0159 0,0143 -0,0016 
2006 0,1526 0,0245 -0,0017 0,0226 0,0214 -0,0012 
2007 0,1124 0,0265 0,0004 0,0076 0,0370 0,0294 
2008 -0,0423 0,0004 -0,0258 0,0379 0,0501 0,0122 
2009 0,0271 -0,0167 -0,0429 0,0211 0,0207 -0,0004 
2010 0,0827 0,0068 -0,0194 0,0247 0,0210 -0,0037 
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14 Appendix 
 
Computer programs 
The computer programs in the thesis couldn’t be presented in a proper manner on paper but I 
can send a copy of them by email peterborchgrevink@gmail.com upon request.  
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